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Abstract 
The article 8 and 12 – European Convention of Human Rights regulate the right to family 
and private life and, respectively, the right to marriage. These rights have been transposed into 
the national legislation of the States-members of European Union. The two rights that we are 
speaking of, which can be found as a constitutional principle and as an ordinary law, tries to 
reduce the public authorities interference into the private and personal family field. The reality 
proves that the right to marriage has been broken by the impossibility of the spouses to marry 
because they can not be divorced. This is the reason why we have two different rights in 
European Convention: the right to private, family life and the right to marriage.  
Many European states still have a limited regulation of the reasons for getting the 
dissolution of marriage. The European Convention has nothing to do with such cases because 
does not regulates the right to divorce and it would be an interference into the national law. 
How can a person be married again if he/she doesn’t have the possibility to divorce? In these 
conditions, can we take the European Convention into consideration as a real instrument of 
protection for the right to marriage?  
The first precedent of ECHR jurisprudences limits the infringement of the right to 
marriage made by the national Courts because of the lack of regulations or a bad interpretation 
of it. 
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Introduction 
From the multitude of laws guaranteeing the right to private and family life and the right 
to marriage we turn our attention to Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
The way in which these legal texts create the necessary levers of the rights considered 
here must be subordinated to the incapability of EU rules to interfere with national laws, 
especially in a matter so fraught with personal and private aspects. Moreover, we believe that 
these rights are extremely difficult to break into the national legal maze, being a corollary of the 
principles established in the field of family relationships which are loaded with tradition, 
morality, religion and social aspects. 1  Standardization of such rules, even when tested by 
numerous projects in Europe, was not successful, given the opposition from the content of legal 
texts from national legal systems.  
 
The Scope of Articles 8 and 12 of the European Court of Human Rights 
A number of international laws govern the right to marry and right to found a family, 
linking them in the same law. Thus, Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union: “The right to marry and right to found a family shall be guaranteed in 
                                                
1
 Ioana Nicolae, Instituţii ale dreptului familiei, Hamangiu Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 142 and the others. 
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accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights”; Article 16 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due 
to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.”; Article 23 § 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966: “The right of men and women 
of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.”; the same effect is the 
art. 8 European Convention on Human Rights:” Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Commission and the 
European Court of Human Rights: “Article 12, in fact, provides for the right to marry and to 
found a family as a single law. (...) [It] actually recognizes the right of men and women, of an 
age when they consent to start a family and have children. The existence of a couple is 
fundamental.” 
The right protected by Article 8 namely the right to private and family life, home and 
correspondence, is part of the conditional rights, which, relative to other rights under the 
Convention - such as the right to life or the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment - may be subject to limitations.  
Thus, after paragraph 1 of Article 8 provides that everyone has the right to respect for 
their private and family life, home and correspondence, the second paragraph shall determine the 
limits that may be made to such rights. The conditions are thus listed under which a public 
authority can intervene as it is necessary for the interference to be stipulated by national law, 
constitute a necessary measure in a democratic society, for national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, prevention of disorder or facts criminal protection of health 
or morals, or the protection of rights and freedoms of others. These conditions expressly set out 
in the text of the Convention combine with the jurisprudence of the Court keeping in mind in 
addition that the interference must be proportionate to the aim pursued.2 
Determining the application limits of Article 8 we need to consider also the limits 
imposed by establishing the scope of Article 8, the meaning given notions of “private life”, 
“family”, “home” and “correspondence” varying in time and space from state to state and even 
within the same state from one social group to another. 
These texts confirmed by the judgments of the European Court on this topic lead us to the 
idea that a “cause-purpose” report is determined, in which the cause is the marriage, and the 
purpose is founding family. Separating the right “to marry” from the right “to start a family” 
would mean making the former “theoretical and illusory”3, an end in itself, would mean reducing 
it to a mere symbol. However, it is unthinkable to tell someone that they have the right to marry, 
but to start a family. “Marriage without a family purpose is nothing than a private relationship 
publicly. Family without her support legal marriage no longer contribute to the common good of 
society, it becomes a simple private good couple.”4 
Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right to marry 
and to found a family within the same fundamental right, indicating: “Men and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws 
governing the exercise of this right.” Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
clearly states that “the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 refers to the traditional marriage 
                                                
2
  Sonia Cososchi, Limitãri ale drepturilor garantate de art. 8 din Convenţia Europeana a Drepturilor Omului, 
http://soniacososchi.blogspot.ro/2008/10/limitele-de-aplicare-ale-art-8-din.html 
3
  Airey c. Irlandei, nr. 6289/73, Decision from 9 October 1979, § 24; Scoppola c. Italia (nr.2), GC, nr. 10249/03, 
Decision from 17 September 2009, § 104 and desident opinions. 
4
  Andreea Popescu, Dreptul bărbatului şi al femeii de a întemeia o familie, European Centre for Law and Justice, 
ECLJ, 2013, p. 6 and the following. 
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between two persons of different biological sex. This follows from the wording of Article 12, 
which clearly indicates that it protects marriage as the foundation of the family.”5 
We can see that the texts of conventions and treaties at a European level uniformly 
enshrines the right to marry and the right to start a family, but following the social realities we 
can easily distinguish the existence of the family without the existence of marriage. It is possible 
that the family is actually based on simple relationships, in which the couple can give birth to 
children. Following the Court jurisprudence we can see that there is a broadening of the notion of 
“family life” from the relations between spouses to which children are added, and at present they 
are extended to de facto relationships, where bonds and manifestations of affection render the 
characteristics of family life, even if it is about a marriage ceremony. In Case X, Z, Y vs. The 
United Kingdom6, the Court has presented some of the elements that must be considered when 
analyzing the existence or not of family life. Thus, members cohabitating over a period of time, a 
child born to or perhaps adopted by the couple in question, the personal ties between parents and 
children, all represent such items as “turns” de facto family in a family according to the meaning 
of the European Court of Human Rights. 
What happens when even if these elements are met, a family cannot be acknowledged as 
such because it is not offered the necessary leverage to respect this legal requirement? 
Acknowledging a family de facto, does not mean you restrict the opportunity for it to be one de 
jure. This situation may arise under the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the 
right to divorce, thus limiting the right to marry or, in other words not protecting the right to a 
first marriage. 
In a more specific and general way, the right to respect family life and the right to marry 
causes the establishment of an obligation within the state related to means.7 The state must “act 
to enable the persons concerned to lead a normal family life.”8 
 
The Limitations of Rights Enshrined in Article 8 and Article 12 of the European 
Court of Human Rights – The Lack of a Guarantee in the Completion of a New Marriage 
Article 12 does not guarantee in any way the right to divorce. The European Court clearly 
declines to conduct an “evolutionary interpretation” of the Convention to extract a right which 
was not inserted in it from the beginning and considers that the right to marriage refers to 
establish the conjugal relations and not to dissolute them. In their common meaning, the words 
“right to marry” in Article 12 refer to forming conjugal relations and not dissolving them. 
Moreover, the preparatory work of this article reveals no intention to incorporate a certain 
guarantee to the right to divorce. The Court would not know how to draw from it, through 
evolutionary interpretation, a right that has been deliberately omitted from the beginning, if the 
Convention were interpreted in the context of today. It shows that the Convention must be read 
as a whole. We can not agree that such a right can result from Article 8, while not resulting from 
art. 12. Thus the Court rejects a petitioners' claim that they are victims of discrimination which is 
contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. 8 in combination with Article 8 due to the fact that Irish 
law may recognize some divorces granted abroad. In its conception, it cannot be considered as 
similar to the situation of petitioners and  
that the people who can get this recognition.9 
All these things considered, European case law establishes a right of married couples to 
live separately if their marriage fails. Supported by positive obligations in relation to Article 8 
                                                
5
  Sheffield and Horsham vs. Great Britain, nr. 22985/93 şi 23390/94, Decision from 30 July 1998. 
6
  X.Y.Z. vs. Great Britain, Decision from 22 April 1997, par. 36, www.echr.coe.int. 
7
  Fr. Sudre, Drept european şi internaţional al drepturilor omului, Editura Polirom, Bucharest, 2006, p. 336. 
8
 Marckx vs. Belgia, nr. 6833/74, Decision from 13 June 1979, Strasbourg, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57534#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57534%22]} 
9
  Johnston and others vs Irland, nr. 9697/82, Decision from 18 December 1986,  
http://jurisprudentacedo.com/JOHNSTON-c.-IRLANDEI-Interdictie-constitutionala-a-divortului-in-Irlanda-si-
consecinte-juridice-care-decurg-de-aici-pentru-un-barbat-si-o-femeie-necasatoriti-impreuna-precum-si-pentru-
copilul-lor.html 
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from the Convention, the European Court building considers, indeed, that the separation of the 
spouses should get a “legal consecration” and “privacy and family can sometimes require the 
means to spare the spouses from the obligation of living together.”10 
Moreover, Article 12 is not subject of the specific limitations of the public policy clause, 
as is the case of Article 8, but entrusts the national legislation with the regulation of the right to 
marry. Under European law, national law must not restrict or limit this right in a manner that 
would undermine “its very substance.”11 If the rules of law recognize divorce, the right of a 
person to remarry should not be limited in this “unreasonable” way. 
Such a situation is found in Swiss law which regulates the prohibition to remarry for a 
period of three years after the divorce imposed on the spouse liable for the divorce (F. vs. 
Switzerland, 18 December 1987) 
A similar situation, a law that unduly restricts the right to marry is found in Bulgaria. In 
this legal system, divorce was permitted only in two cases, namely when marital relationship 
break up and divorce by consent of the spouses. In the case here cited12, after they were married 
in 1986, as a student, the plaintiff and his wife separated in fact after the latter graduated and 
returned to her hometown in northern Bulgaria with two children born to the marriage. Relations 
between the couple cooled considerably, so the wife asked the court for alimony for her two 
children, the pension was granted. 
Upon graduation, the plaintiff moved in with another woman to a town in southern 
Bulgaria, in 2002, and had another child. Wanting to remarry, the husband filed a divorce action 
in contradiction with his wife. She argued that the divorce not be granted, however, since she and 
her husband were married and she is not responsible for their separation in fact, was convinced 
that reconciliation with her husband was still possible in the interests of the two children; 
instance court dismissed the application for divorce, given the national legislation at the time. 
The first instance court held that “dissolution of conjugal life of the couple was due to 
unacceptable behavior” of her husband. The appeals have pointed out the “disagreements 
between the couple which hitherto prevented a reconciliation between spouses were not 
“insurmountable”.13 
Any attempt to divorce by consent of both spouses was vehemently rejected by the wife.  
When the case came to the European Court of Human Rights, it invoked the principle of 
subsidiary, according to which “it cannot substitute national courts in the determination of facts 
and interpretation of law” (see, to that effect, JH and other 23 vs. France, November 24, 2009, nr. 
49637/09). The Court also concluded that national courts have complied with their obligation to 
properly motivate rulings on divorce proceedings brought by the applicant. The Court noted that 
although the applicant argued that the relationship with his wife was deeply and irrevocably 
altered long time since they were separated in fact he has a new girlfriend and they live together 
and had a child together with national courts note that the only disagreement between spouses 
was pertaining to establishing a joint residence and therefore surmountable. The responsibility 
for altering marital relationship between spouses was again laid at the applicant’s door and in 
motivating its decision; the Court answered the applicant’s claims with arguments based on 
evidence in the file. 
However, the Court reiterated that neither Article 8 nor Article12 of the Convention 
guarantees the right to divorce (Johnston and others vs. Ireland), but recognizing the right to 
divorce is not equivalent to the absence of any conventional protection. The Court has repeatedly 
addressed the implementation of divorce proceedings, identifying elements that could affect the 
effectiveness of the right to marry, so that it comes to a situation where, although a right is 
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  Ibidem. 
11
  Christine Goodwin vs. Great Britain, nr. 28957/95, Decision from 11 July 2002, www.echr.coe.int. 
12
  Ivanov and Petrova vs. Bulgariei, Decision from 14 June 2011, www.echr.coe.int 
13
  Lavinia Cîrciumaru, Ionuţ Militaru, Dreptul la divorţ (Article 6, 8 and 12 European Court of Human Rights): 
Imposibilitatea unei persoane de a se recăsători izvorâtă din refuzul pronunţării divorţului pentru prima căsătorie, 
JurisClasor CEDO Journal, University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 27-30.  
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neither recognized nor guaranteed by the Convention, i.e. the right to divorce), he has a certain 
protection indirectly.14 
Firstly, although the law provides for divorce, Article 12 of the Convention guarantees 
the right of divorced persons to remarry without suffering unreasonable restrictions in the state 
law that has emerged in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights because of F. vs. 
Switzerland.15 
Secondly, by violating the principle of celerity of divorce proceedings may raise the issue 
of infringement of Article 12 of the Convention16, but in this case, none of these cases was 
considered applicable because it was not thought as a temporary restriction to remarry after 
divorce or of excessive length of proceedings for divorce.  
Throughout time, the Court stressed that the Convention cannot be interpreted as granting 
entitlement for divorce and even less of a favorable outcome in this case. 
In this case, the Court ruled that the dismissal of divorce was not based on opposition 
husband have not come to dissolution of marriage, but without finding a deep and irreversible 
deterioration of the marital bond. Court noted that national judges felt the “de facto separation of 
the couple was not an insurmountable obstacle for the spouses and therefore the relations 
between them were irreparably damaged.” The Court also ruled that implications of property and 
inheritance or restrictions on alienation of common property as a result of maintaining marriage 
is nothing more than the logical consequences of his rejection of the divorce request that are 
subject to national regulation on property relations between spouses. At the same time, it was 
rejected by the Court and the complaint filed by the plaintiff's concubine, who has not invoked 
the general prohibition to marry, but the impossibility of concluding a civil marriage first 
applicant on the ground that prevent the marriage of the two plaintiffs was the result of a general 
prohibition, but stems directly from the rejection of the divorce for good reasons - the application 
for divorce brought by the plaintiff and the application of the law of the principle of monogamy.  
 
Conclusions 
From this analysis of these concrete cases brought before European Court of Human 
Rights because of violations of Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention, we see the balance that the 
Court tries to guarantee between the exercise of rights as prescribed by the Convention and 
limiting all interference that it may have with the national laws of Member States. Even if the 
right to divorce is not provided in the Convention, along with other items mentioned within it 
(e.g. Article 6 concerning the right to a fair trial), no more than an indirect protection of this right 
was managed. Respecting procedural elements and the way national courts have justified their 
judgments have most often been analyzed. Not recognizing the right to divorce does not equal 
the absence of any conventional protection. 
However, we believe that from case to case, the Court should consider the context in 
which manner is guaranteed the right to marry and that the limits imposed by the “impossibility 
of interference” meet certain prerequisites: to be provided by law; to constitute a necessary 
measure in a democratic society; for national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or the 
protection of rights and freedoms of others; to be proportionate to the aim pursued. However, 
even though throughout time, the Court jurisprudence was formed in supporting the right to 
marriage and not its dissolution, we consider this as the only guarantee of a first marriage and the 
right not to remarry, the latter remains suspended between gaps of laws national and the 
                                                
14
  Valérie Gas and Nathalie Dubois vs. France, August 31, 2010, nr. 25951/07, RR vs. Poland, May 26, 2011, nr. 
27617/04, http://www.hotararicedo.ro/index.php/news/2011/06/dreptul-la-divort-art.-6-8-i-12-cedo-imposibilitatea-
unei-persoane-de-a-se-recasatori-izvorat-din-refuzul-pronuntarii-divortului 
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  Lavinia Cîrciumaru, Ionuţ Militaru, op. cit., p. 27-30. 
16
  Aresti Charalambous c. Ciprului, 19 July 2007, nr. 43151/04; Wildgruber c. Germaniei, requests nr. 42402/05 
and 42423/05. 
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restrictive interpretation of the text of Articles 8 and 12 from the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
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